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Priority No. 2 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHERE IT 
DID NOT MAKE FINDINGS ON THE RECORD REGARDING 
STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED FACTORS BEARING UPON THE 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING ORDER. 
The State erroneously contends that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences even 
though it failed to make any findings on the record as to 
Appellant John Legg, Jr.fs ("Legg") history, character and 
rehabilitative needs - statutorily prescribed factors that a 
trial court must adequately consider when imposing consecutive 
sentences. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999) (Consecutive 
Sentencing Statute); see also State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 
1998) (sentencing court must give "adequate weight" to each 
factor set forth in § 76-3-401(4) before imposing consecutive 
sentence). Citing State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997), the State asserts that a sentencing court is deemed 
to have adequately considered all relevant factors so long as 
pertinent information is in the record before the court at the 
time of sentencing. See Statefs Brief ("S.B.") at Point I.B. 
The State's interpretation of Schweitzer is too broad. As 
explained in Leggfs opening brief, his case presents a far less 
egregious set of facts. See Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at n.l. 
Hence, inferring adequate consideration of all relevant facts in 
light of the statutorily prescribed factors set forth in § 76-3-
401(4) is not appropriate here. 
Indeed, it is a well-settled principle that this Court may 
uphold a lower court's failure to enter findings on the record 
only if "it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually 
made such findings." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 n.6 
(Utah 1991) . Assumed findings, however, are inappropriate if the 
"ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable.'' Id. 
at 788; see also State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 
1997) (discussing three circumstances in which it would be 
unreasonable to assume trial court made findings, e.g., ambiguous 
facts or an explicit mandate by statute or case law that such 
findings be made). 
The facts are so ambiguous such that it is not reasonable to 
assume that the court made the appropriate findings under § 7 6-3-
401(4). For example, the gravity of the offenses at issue here 
do not unequivocally call for consecutive sentencing. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). Two of the three convictions were for 
non-violent property crimes (attempted receiving of a stolen 
vehicle and burglary). R.137 (Judgment, Sentence & Commitment). 
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The injuries sustained by Officer Hamideh were limited, 
consisting only of minor scrapes on his calves and hand, plus 
slight tearing of his uniform. R.95. Moreover, the injuries 
occurred to Officer Hamideh because he held onto Leggfs car as 
Legg drove away; they were not the result of an intentional act 
on Legg!s part to hurt Officer Hamideh specifically. R.93-94. 
Even the court failed to ascribe a "malevolent intent" to this 
incident. R.158[9]. The other victims in this case, Lindsay and 
Sheryl Strasburg, said in their victim impact statements that 
Leggfs actions did not result in any physical or emotional 
injuries, property damage, medical treatment, counseling, or an 
impact on their livelihood or lifestyle. R.157 (Victim Impact 
Statements). 
Further ambiguity exists as to Legg!s history, character and 
rehabilitative needs, which were not addressed at all by the 
lower court. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4); R.158[8-9]. The 
State paints an unduly negative picture of Legg and misrepresents 
the record to assert that his criminal record includes a number 
of felonies. S.B. 13. However, as explained by defense counsel 
below, his record actually includes only one felony conviction 
for business burglary. R.158[3]. The other felony conviction 
was overturned on appeal. Id. Another conviction for aggravated 
assault was prosecuted as a class A misdemeanor. Id. 
The State additionally paints Legg as a long-time habitual 
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drug user, implying that his addiction contributed to the 
incident. S.B. 7, 13. Legg admitted a significant drug problem. 
R.158[5]. But, he noted to the court that he had been a 
"responsible citizen" since he was out of prison, and was using 
methamphetamine on this occasion only as a response to the recent 
death of his infant son. R.158[7]. 
The sentencing judge's exclusive focus on the "serious risk" 
that Legg posed to Officer Hamideh establishes ambiguity as to 
whether the court properly weighed all the evidence relevant to 
the factors set forth in § 76-3-401(4). Indeed, the record's 
silence as to the court's findingsf combined with the ambiguity 
of the facts in this case as they relate to the appropriateness 
of consecutive sentencing, preclude this Court from adequately 
reviewing the consecutive sentencing order. See State v. Jarman, 
1999 UT App. 269, 1 8 n.4, 987 P.2d 1284 (citation omitted) 
(upholding trial court order despite lack of requisite written 
findings only where oral findings provide sufficient basis for 
appellate review). 
In addition to the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court's 
opinion in Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, 973 P.2d 422, compels the 
conclusion that sentencing courts are required to make findings 
on the record in imposing consecutive sentencing under § 76-3-
401(4). Looking at the language of the statute at issue, the 
Supreme Court held, 
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Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that when a court imposes sanctions, "the court shall 
describe the conduct determined to constitute a 
violation of this rule and explain the basis for the 
sanction imposed." Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3). We hold 
today that the inverse to this rule also holds. When 
denying a rule 11 motion for sanctions, a trial court 
must likewise describe the conduct constituting a basis 
for the denial. In other words, there should be 
findings on the record, or other appropriate 
explanation of the trial court's rationale, that will 
enable the appellate courts to apply the [Barnard v.1 
Sutliffr, 846 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1992)] standard [of 
review]. 
Morse, 1999 UT at 1 13. The Morse Court reasoned that review of 
a rule 11 motion for sanctions involved a "three-tiered" standard 
of review, reviewing factual findings for clear error, legal 
conclusions for correctness, and the type and amount of sanction 
for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1 10 (citing Sutliff, 846 P.2d 
at 1234). However, " [a]pplication of the Sutliff standard to the 
case in its present posture [was] not possible because of the 
lack of any meaningful explanation [on the record] supporting the 
district court's order denying sanctions." Id. at 1 14. 
The Morse rationale compels a like conclusion here. First, 
the language of § 76-3-401 indicates that findings on the record 
are necessary. Using language similar to that of Utah R. Civ. P. 
11, section 76-3-401 provides that vv(l) [a] court shall determine 
. . . whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. . . 
. [and] (4) . . . shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs 
of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
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sentences." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (emphasis added); compare 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(3) ("the court shall describe the conduct 
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the 
basis for the sanction imposed"). The act of "consider[ing]" and 
"determin[ing]" implies a logical process that must be reflected 
in the record by way of findings. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 
1224-25 (unreasonable to assume trial court made findings if 
statute or case law require that such findings be made). 
Additionally, the standard of review applied to consecutive 
sentencing orders necessitates findings so that this Court may 
conduct an adequate appellate review. See Morse, 1999 UT at SI 14 
("lack of any meaningful explanation supporting [] court's order" 
precludes appellate review). Consecutive sentencing orders are 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. 
Although deference is granted to the trial court, this Court must 
be able to understand the lower court's findings to determine 
whether its consecutive sentencing decision was reasonable under 
the circumstances. See Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. Absent any 
findings on the record by which to apply this standard of review, 
this Court is precluded from carrying out its appellate function. 
This Court should remand for resentencing rather than for 
entry of findings in order to avoid hindsight justification. 
Remanding for findings at this juncture would only tempt the 
court to make a "post hoc rationalization" for its consecutive 
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sentencing order. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 789 (remanding for new 
trial rather than entry of findings where trial court failed to 
make findings as to constitutional reliability of eyewitness 
identification evidence). 
As a final matter, significant policies support this Court's 
intervention. First, the sentencing judgefs summary reliance 
solely upon the possible danger that Legg presented to Hamideh 
reflects an all-too-common tendency among sentencing courts to 
make over-simplified and ambiguous orders, which result in 
appeals to clarify the sentencing decision. It also prevents 
appellate courts from adequately reviewing such decisions. See 
supra. Moreover, the absence of findings gives the Board of 
Pardons little guidance when defendants appear to request parole. 
Sentencing judges also miss an important opportunity to admonish 
defendants and to steer them toward rehabilitation and a changed 
life. More importantly, summary and ambiguous sentencing 
decisions have the appearance of unfairness and give defendants 
disincentives to rehabilitate themselves. Requiring courts to 
make findings on the record when imposing a consecutive sentence 
would avoid these dangers.1 
Legg submits on his opening brief in response to the 
State's arguments not specifically addressed herein. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in 
his opening brief, Legg requests this Court to vacate his 
consecutive sentence and remand for resentencing to concurrent 
terms. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /<7^ day of March, 2001. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
u% 
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